CVSS v3.1
4.7
EPSS
0.19%
Published
Feb 26, 2025
Modified
Oct 1, 2025
Public PoC / Exploit
All weaponized →No public PoC or exploit code indexed for this CVE.
Links to public security research (Exploit-DB, Nuclei, Trickest, GitHub) for defensive use only.
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/core: Fix data race between perf_event_set_output() and perf_mmap_close() Yang Jihing reported a race between perf_event_set_output() and perf_mmap_close(): CPU1 CPU2 perf_mmap_close(e2) if (atomic_dec_and_test(&e2->rb->mmap_count)) // 1 - > 0 detach_rest = true ioctl(e1, IOC_SET_OUTPUT, e2) perf_event_set_output(e1, e2) ... list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &e2->rb->event_list, rb_entry) ring_buffer_attach(e, NULL); // e1 isn't yet added and // therefore not detached ring_buffer_attach(e1, e2->rb) list_add_rcu(&e1->rb_entry, &e2->rb->event_list) After this; e1 is attached to an unmapped rb and a subsequent perf_mmap() will loop forever more: again: mutex_lock(&e->mmap_mutex); if (event->rb) { ... if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&e->rb->mmap_count)) { ... mutex_unlock(&e->mmap_mutex); goto again; } } The loop in perf_mmap_close() holds e2->mmap_mutex, while the attach in perf_event_set_output() holds e1->mmap_mutex. As such there is no serialization to avoid this race. Change perf_event_set_output() to take both e1->mmap_mutex and e2->mmap_mutex to alleviate that problem. Additionally, have the loop in perf_mmap() detach the rb directly, this avoids having to wait for the concurrent perf_mmap_close() to get around to doing it to make progress.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HWeaknesses (CWE)
Affected Products (15)
References (8)